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Hollis Robbins's avatar

Great piece. I would add the bureaucratic higher education regime to enemies of competence and national expertise. It isn't only radical regimes. The metrics regimes and isomorphism in higher ed, "efficiency" and "workforce readiness" are behind senior faculty buyouts and loss of knowledge pipelines. The drying up of papyrology and language pipelines may not make a movie scene but it is happening.

Scott Sumner's avatar

Good points. And to be fair, the left also engages in some of this, as we saw with the more extreme examples of wokism. Both ends of the horseshoe are prone to fanaticism.

Treekllr's avatar

"the US is powerful enough to make its own decisions."

Is it? Bc it seems like theyre all being made by one man, and the rest of country is powerless to do anything about it.

So could trump have been "played" by netanyahu? I got the impression he was by xi, and always has been by putin. All 3 of these leaders are playing a much longer game than trump is. I think at least netanyahu played his hand well, and better than trump did.

Scott Sumner's avatar

Are you saying that American voters elected a senile old fool? Yes, and the sky is blue. What else is new?

"the rest of country is powerless"

Powerless, or cowards? Why doesn't Congress do something?

Treekllr's avatar

Thats the question. But i think, for the part of congress that matters rn, its not so much cowardice as it is avarice. Still, trumps grip on his party is something, like louis xiv

Scott Sumner's avatar

"L'État, c'est moi"

That's French for "MAGA is whatever I say it is."

Alan Goldhammer's avatar

On Marco Rubio's first statement about Israel "dragging" the US into war, it's turning out that was the correct statement. Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan documented the lead up to the recent attack in the NY Times this past week and it was a face to face meeting with Netanyahu that triggered things. Their book on this will be coming out in mid-June and should be fascinating reading (I have already pre-ordered a copy).

Scott Sumner's avatar

I blame Trump. Netanyahu gave bad advice, but it was 100% Trump's decision. He got carried away by his success in Venezuela.

Robert Benkeser's avatar

Scott, I agree that U.S. conduct matters here. The Maduro capture and the killing of Khamenei make it easier for China to argue that the U.S. is acting coercively and inconsistently. I’m not defending every U.S. action.

But I think your argument skips over the key issue: explaining China’s perspective is not the same as justifying China’s conduct.

On the nuclear point, I don’t think the choice is “the U.S. lied in 2025” or “the U.S. is lying now.” A third possibility is that the 2025 strikes badly damaged known facilities but did not eliminate Iran’s enriched uranium, technical capacity, or ability to reconstitute. That would make the Trump administration’s “obliterated” rhetoric misleading or overconfident, but it would not prove that nuclear concerns today are fabricated.

More importantly, the satellite point should not be minimized as merely “dual-use technology.” Dual-use imagery becomes military support when it is used for target identification, battle-damage assessment, or strike planning. The same issue applies in Ukraine: Chinese firms have been accused or sanctioned for imagery that supported Russian or Wagner operations. Even if China is not sending divisions or aircraft carriers, helping an aggressor improve targeting is still meaningful support.

So I understand why China distrusts U.S. intentions. But that does not answer the moral question I raised: if Beijing wants to be treated as a principled defender of sovereignty and territorial integrity, why is it comfortable with support that helps Russia strike Ukraine or Iran strike U.S. forces, while doing little to restrain either? “The U.S. behaved badly too” may be relevant context, but it is not a defense of China’s choices.

Scott Sumner's avatar

I think we agree more than you assume we agree. Again, I do not support China's foreign policy. My entire criticism has to do with how we respond to the policies that we disapprove of. I'm saying that China's foreign policy sins are much closer to the sins of someone like Trump, than to the far worse sins of an aggressor like Putin. I don't favor other countries putting sanctions on the US, nor do I favor the US putting sanctions on China. I do favor sanctions on Russia.

The only thing I disagree with in your comment is your suggestion that the US government is not lying. Sorry, but Trump's a serial liar, and euphemisms like "misleading" don't disguise that fact. No sane person could have interpreted his 2025 claim as "In a few more months we'll have to go to war with Iran because of the nuclear threat". He said it was destroyed, not damaged.

On the Ukraine issue, you can't have it both ways. If you insist that China is helping Russia, then it's equally true that China is helping Ukraine with its extensive supply of drones. That's not a defense of China, some experts view it as a cynical attempt to extend the war, to divert the West from a focus on China.

Robert Benkeser's avatar

Scott, I agree with your narrower point that China is not morally equivalent to Russia. Russia is the direct aggressor in Ukraine; China is more of an enabler, supplier, and strategic beneficiary. That distinction matters.

I also agree that Trump’s “obliterated” rhetoric was not just “misleading.” It was much more categorical than the evidence justified. If Iran still has large amounts of enriched uranium and a remaining ability to reconstitute, then “obliterated Iran’s ability to create nuclear weapons” was false or badly overclaimed.

Where I disagree is with the “equally true” framing on Ukraine. There is a big difference between Ukrainian producers relying on Chinese components because China dominates the commercial drone supply chain, and Chinese firms or specialists helping sanctioned Russian arms makers develop attack drones, route engines as “cooling units,” or provide satellite imagery useful for targeting. Those are not symmetrical forms of “help.”

So I would separate three claims:

China is not Putin-level culpable for the invasion itself. Agreed.

Trump’s Iran rhetoric was dishonest or reckless. Largely agreed.

Therefore targeted sanctions on Chinese firms helping Russia or Iran are unjustified. I don’t think that follows.

I am not arguing for broad sanctions on China as a country. I’m arguing for targeted sanctions on firms and intermediaries that knowingly help Russia or Iran improve their ability to strike Ukrainian, American, or allied targets. That seems proportional, and it does not require pretending the U.S. has clean hands

Scott Sumner's avatar

OK, I think we are pretty close on these issues. I was complaining about broad sanctions on China, not specific sanctions narrowing targeted to some sort of military problem.

BTW, I am far more pro-Ukraine than the administration. If I had my way, our policy would be much more favorable to Ukraine, even if slightly less favorable on Chinese sanctions. That's because I strongly favor providing much more massive military and economic aid to Ukraine.

I also favor opening the door to much higher rates of high skilled immigration, especially from Asia. I believe that would do far more to strengthen our national security than export controls on goods going to China (apart from weapons, where controls are clearly appropriate.)

Robert Benkeser's avatar

I can't say this is definitive proof that China wants Russia to prevail in Ukraine, but it is unnerving nonetheless. I do not think most Americans are paying enough attention to this because it would imply that Western countries are already engaged in a proxy war with China in Ukraine.

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russians-covertly-trained-by-china-return-fight-ukraine-sources-say-2026-05-19/

Robert Benkeser's avatar

That clarification helps. I think the disagreement is now pretty precise.

I agree that avoiding direct great-power war should be a central goal. But I’m not convinced that making Taiwan less secure actually makes world war less likely. It may reduce one pathway to war — immediate U.S.-China conflict — while increasing another: Beijing may become more willing to blockade, quarantine, seize offshore islands, or invade Taiwan if it believes the U.S. has taken intervention off the table.

On Taiwan keeping control of its military: that sounds better than a Hong Kong-style arrangement, but I don’t see how it works without an outside guarantee. Who controls Taiwan’s chain of command, weapons imports, intelligence ties, cyber systems, and defense planning? If Beijing controls those things, Taiwan does not really control its military. If Taiwan controls them, then Taiwan remains functionally sovereign in defense matters, and it is unclear why Beijing would accept that as real unification.

That is why I think strategic ambiguity is still the least-bad option. The U.S. Taiwan Relations Act already avoids a blank-check defense guarantee while still treating coercion against Taiwan as a grave concern and maintaining Taiwan’s defensive capacity. That is imperfect, but it preserves deterrence without making an automatic war promise.

So I agree your proposal might reduce the risk of one kind of world war. My concern is that it raises the odds of the precipitating crisis — Chinese coercion or war against Taiwan — and once that starts, escalation paths reopen anyway through Japan, U.S. bases, sanctions, naval incidents, or domestic pressure. I don’t think the world-war risk disappears; it may just be deferred until after Taiwan is already under attack.

Scott Sumner's avatar

Good discussion. I have two points to make:

1. I don't think ambiguity is credible unless there's actually a chance that the US would go to war with China. And I am completely opposed to a US-China war unless China attacks the US or a country that we have a treaty to defend (Nato, Japan, Australia, etc.). I doubt they do that. I don't think it's credible to privately decide you would never fight China, but have an ambiguous policy. American politics doesn't work that way. If it's a credible threat, that means we really might fight WWIII. China won't surrender, they'd have to be defeated.

2. I did envision Taiwan staying functionally independent for 50 years. Why would Xi agree to that? Consider his two options:

A. A very risky war with huge cost and uncertain outcome.

B. A big PR victory where Xi can tell the Chinese people that he's peacefully achieved a glide path to reunification along the same lines as Hong Kong.

Why would Taiwan agree? Avoids a potentially horrific near term war, and a lot can change in 50 years. Perhaps China is less repressive by that time. After all, AI is likely to transform the world in a dramatic fashion, so the issues we worry about today might seem meaningless in 50 years.

BTW, I think Xi made a huge mistake with his 2019 crackdown on Hong Kong, as that makes this plan a harder sell. But again, Taiwan keeps control of its military, an important difference.

Robert Benkeser's avatar

I would be curious to hear your take on China reportedly assisting the IRGC by providing satellite imagery and weapons. I want to believe that China is not a threat to Americans, but it seems like they are acting in ways that would cause reasonable people to doubt it. Why is China relatively closely aligned with North Korea, Russia, and Iran? Wouldn't they go a long ways to reassuring Americans if they distanced themselves from Iran?

Scott Sumner's avatar

Obviously, I'm not happy about China's foreign policy. But I also feel like if we are going to treat them like an adversary then they'll treat us as an adversary. Right now, the US is the country that is launching multiple wars, and even threatening to invade our allies. We refuse to rule out the use of force if they attack Taiwan. So I'm not surprised that China seeks allies wherever they can find them, including Russia and Iran.

Robert Benkeser's avatar

I see that point, but the idea that China appears to be helping Russia, Iran, and other U.S. adversaries target Ukrainian and American forces through satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence, which can materially support lethal operations, is unsettling to say the least.

Scott Sumner's avatar

I don't know enough to comment on that specific issue, but over time I've grown skeptical of some of what I read in this area. For instance, the media often reports that China supplies useful material to Russia, but tends to downplay the fact that China has provided enormous assistance to Ukraine in the form of drones, and that this has helped Ukraine to reach a stalemate in the war. The media also tends to ignore the enormous quantity of European material that goes to Russia through central Asia (despite sanctions), with a wink and a nod.

There is also very little media coverage of that fact that when the UN voted to condemn Russia for the invasion, China abstained while the US sided with Russia, Iran and North Korea in voting against the resolution--we were on the opposite side of virtually every civilized country.

The point is not to defend China--I object to many of their policies--rather to show how easy it would be to construct an argument that the US is one of the "bad guy" in world affairs.

Robert Benkeser's avatar

Those points complicate the moral narrative, but they don’t answer whether China is helping Russia or Iran target U.S./Ukrainian forces. Commercial Chinese drone components reaching Ukraine are not equivalent to Chinese satellite imagery or intelligence helping Russia conduct strikes. Both can be true: China can be economically entangled with both sides while still materially tilting toward Russia in strategically important ways.

Scott Sumner's avatar

I don't disagree with what you say, but I guess I interpret the evidence differently. I argue that both the US and China are to blame for the current cold war between the two powers. I would very much like to see us try to improve relations with China by changing our behavior. Perhaps doing so would also improve their behavior.

Robert Benkeser's avatar

I think we may agree on some low-hanging fruit: oppose anti-Chinese-American discrimination, distinguish clearly between the Chinese people and the CCP, and avoid gratuitous provocations like threats against Greenland.

But I’m curious what substantive U.S. policy changes you have in mind. Should we relax export controls on high-end semiconductors and AI chips? Reduce tariffs? Pull back from security commitments to Taiwan, or maintain strategic ambiguity? Change our approach to South China Sea freedom-of-navigation operations?

I’m open to the idea that U.S. behavior matters, but “change our behavior” can mean very different things depending on the policy.

Richard's avatar

Just like we help Chinese adversaries and adversaries of Chinese allies (like Russia) in Ukraine and Taiwan. What are you expecting China to do?

Robert Benkeser's avatar

To me, it really crystallizes matters. It is pretty well established that China using satellite data to help Russia target and strike Ukrainian targets (and likely killing Ukrainians) and help Iran target and strike American targets (and likely killing Americans). China would be a lot more principled if they insisted on Ukrainian territorial integrity and helped us push Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program.

Scott Sumner's avatar

Look at things from China's perspective. In 2025, the US attacks Iran, and then announces that their nuclear program has been completely destroyed. In 2026, we kidnap Venezuela's president. A few weeks later we assassinate Iran's leader. Is this the behavior of a peaceful country? Were we lying in 2025, in which case why believe anything we say today about our war aims? Or were we telling the truth in 2025, in which case we are lying today when we claim this war is about Iran's nuclear program? Here's the Economist:

"China has offered little by way of serious economic, diplomatic or military aid. Its more indirect, and perhaps more important, contribution comes from space."

That doesn't sound like overwhelming support.

I would prefer that China provided no aid to Iran. But I can also understand why they'd be strongly opposed to the US attack on Iran (as I am strongly opposed to the US attack on Iran), and why they would not go out of their way to prevent the use of dual use technologies such as satellite photos.

We started this war. We are the aggressor.

Kenny Fraser's avatar

Hopefully this administration is swept away and the damage that accumulates is seen as an opportunity for rebirth and renewal - the risk is that whoever comes next simply uses the same methods on the opposite direction. Speaking as a European which knows we need the US as a strong and reliable friend.

Scott Sumner's avatar

The Hungarian election is certainly a bright spot--I hope the US follows suit in 2028.

John NH's avatar

Do you think Trump was truly puzzled when Europe did not follow us into war, or instead was he intentionally embarking on a war he knew Europe wouldn't support, so that now he has a basis for declaring NATO defunct?

Scott Sumner's avatar

I'd say probably neither. You are correct that he may have known the Europeans would not be enthusiastic to help, but I doubt that issue was forefront in his mind when he launched the war. I believe he got overconfident that he could repeat the easy success of Venezuela. I doubt he even expected the Strait of Hormuz to close.

Richard's avatar

It doesn't really matter what Trump declares. NATO is de facto defunct, and any European without their head in the sand should realize that by now.

Benjamin Cole's avatar

OT, but Sumner likes to use stock market results as a real world indicators...so do I.

"S&P 500 continues higher one day after benchmark wipes out Iran war losses: Live updates" 4/14

I can hardly believe this, but there it is.

Trump's plan to blockade the Strait is a winner? The market says so? Seems like it.

Scott Sumner's avatar

Bloomberg reports:

"US energy stocks are poised to erase all of the gains seen since President Donald Trump started the war against Iran as oil prices pull back on the prospect of further negotiations aimed at ending the more than six-week conflict."

So the market hates war and likes it when Trump is expected to surrender. Who knew?

Benjamin Cole's avatar

I'm not sure Trump's naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is a "surrender."

The blockade has even been condemned as an "escalation."

BTW, I am not a Trump fan. He is a man of many and deep flaws, but then I have my own shortcomings too.

Trump may be right on Iran. The Fat Lady has not yet sung on this chapter.

I unashamedly call for regime change in Tehran. If Trump pulls that off, well, then all hail Trump.

Even Nixon was occasionally right.

Scott Sumner's avatar

Ah, so oil prices fell on an "escalation"? Whatever you say.

"I unashamedly call for regime change in Tehran."

And I unashamedly call for regime change in America.

Benjamin Cole's avatar

I don't think there is an equivalence between Trump, and the IRGC, the latter who may have slaughtered up to 40,000 citizens in Iran recently.

But there is some good news: TOKYO (Kyodo) -- The Nikkei stock index ended at a record high above 59,000 points on Thursday on growing optimism about peace negotiations between the United States and Iran.

--30--

I think the naval blockade may bring the IRGC to the table, and global stock markets are reacting to that. The IRGC doesn't have much else to sell, except military drones, and those factories have been wiped out.

If that is a "win" for Trump, I don't care. The world is bigger than Trump.

Scott Sumner's avatar

Trump has lost the war, all this stuff going on now is to convince his foolish supporters that he's going to "win".

Benjamin Cole's avatar

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/us-iran-strait-hormuz-blockade-toll-talks-6055796

I notice Singapore people have interesting takes---they are outside US thought bubbles.

Richard's avatar

So how's regime change in Iran going?

ContraVerse's avatar

It's hilarious that rightwingers fear-mongered a "competency crisis". Talking about projection...

whitenight's avatar

november,liberalism will win

Gian's avatar

Are American generals competent? Looking at the track record, it would hardly seem so. So, the firing of the generals is perhaps called for and quite belated. Indeed, the military performance of American forces is quite superior at present with the new generals.

Scott Sumner's avatar

Please! The generals are being fired for not being sufficiently MAGA. It has nothing to do with competence. Indeed, the more competent the top government official, the more likely they are to be fired.

Ralph Sisson's avatar

Yes, they are competent. The part of the war we are seeing now is the part at which the military excel. We saw the same thing in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and even going back to Vietnam. What we have not been good at is occupying countries and achieving strategic goals. However, that is largely due to civilian leadership ie POTUS which does a poor job of determining strategy and setting achievable endgame goals.

The current situation so far is pretty much the same we have seen in other recent wars. We trounce their military on the battlefield. We then realize we arent achieving our real goals and it's costing a lot more than we were told it would cost. (Note that the same people who pushed for us to invade Iraq were the ones pushing us to attack Iran.)

Steve

Kevin Erdmann's avatar

I think the answer to Tyler’s question might sort of be “yes”. I think there is something to be said for Ed Leamer’s “Housing is the Business Cycle”, and with pent up demand for millions of homes, it will be very hard for the Fed to perform so badly for the pre-recession trends in housing starts that always preceded monetary recessions to develop.

Scott Sumner's avatar

I'm less optimistic. And we had a recession in 2020 that was not caused by the Fed. So even with good monetary policy we'll still have recessions.

Robert Ferrell's avatar

Very good read. A tangent, related to the Cultural Revolution: I highly recommend Fang Lizhi's "The Most Wanted Man In China". It is a very real account (an autobiography) of what can happen to academics in a culture of ideology. One of the occasions when Fang was sent for reeducation was because he taught cosmology founded in empirical observation, which was at odds with Marxism. Fanaticism loses in the long run, but it is also worth opposing in the short run.

Scott Sumner's avatar

Thanks for the tip.

Wandering Llama's avatar

It seems that Orban's replacement is cut very much from the same cloth. Not sure how much we should celebrate yet.

Scott Sumner's avatar

The early signs are positive:

“Hungary will once again be a strong ally in the European Union and in NATO,” Magyar said. “Hungary’s place is, will be and has been in Europe for a thousand years.” . . .

Orban’s ouster is now likely to pave the way for the release of €90 billion ($106 billion) in assistance that Kyiv badly needs to stay in the fight after more than four years of Russia’s full-scale invasion."

Note that Orban was quite hostile to the EU and Ukraine.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-12/hungary-s-election-winner-magyar-calls-on-president-to-resign?srnd=homepage-americas

Scott Sumner's avatar

Agreed, but I predict he'll be far more willing to work with the EU. We shall see.

sk's avatar

We are all competent in a relative sense and that would include you, too.

Scott Sumner's avatar

I'm more competent at blogging that Hegseth is at warmongering.

Gian's avatar

Hegseth is competent at war-mongering though less competent at waging war. Technical competence is the least of worry here. American problem has ever been strategic confusion, and it was so even in the time of the bemedelled generals who have been replaced.