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Lorenzo Warby's avatar

Yasheng Huang’s ‘The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead to Its Decline’ is a great book. There is a lot of amazing contemporary scholarship on China, which is often based on fieldwork.

Such scholarship raises parallel questions to what books are available in China. Does the CCP not care what Western academics write? Is this traditional Chinese respect for scholarship re-surfacing along with the neo-Confucianism? Is this the central CCP using Western scholarship to be more aware of/check on its own internal dynamics? Some combination of these? Something else entirely?

The PRC is very much not the USSR despite the CCP being very much a Leninist Party in organisation and official ideology. The post 1978 economic opening has gone way beyond the Soviet 1921-8 NEP—both in scale and duration. There are some parallels between Stalin’s post-1928 reversals and Xi’s post-2012 shifts, but Xi has not gone even close to as far.

Parallels are tricky. The Soviet General Secretary who presided over the highest rate of turnover in officials and generals compared to Stalin was Gorbachev.

Chinese dramas, particularly the costumed variety, often have elements that could be construed as criticisms of Mao, or even of Xi. There are rumours that Xi is very unhappy about them, but apart from two already produced series (Immortality and Eternal Faith)—both based on popular danmei’s (Chinese boy-love/BL web novels)—ending up in censorship limbo, it is hard to see any pressure against them.

One reason I watch C-dramas— apart from the sheer quality and sense of beauty—is that they are much less likely to preach at you than contemporary Western versions, which nowadays often sacrifice story and respect for sources for a tedious didacticism. This has so many ironies.

Xi seems to wrestling with the problems of fragmented authoritarianism, trying to impose more consistency in policy, and policy delivery, via a technocratic centralism. This has clear information and incentive problems.

Claims during the Cold War about convergence between the West and the Soviet bloc were clearly way overblown. Though historian Sir Niall Ferguson has pointed out that the US’s gerontocratic politics has a bit of a late-Soviet feel to it.

In the contemporary world there is perhaps more convergence. The Biden Administration using “private-public partnerships” to do end-runs around the First Amendment in pressuring social media companies to censor or to, via de-banking (pushing people, NGOs, firms out of the banking system), punish dissent, and as an instrument of industrial policy in tech, was very much an authoritarian turn. There was a reason Trump suddenly had more friends in tech. Just as there is a reason there were major swings to the Republicans in very “blue” cities.

The West has serious problems of over-weening or metastasising bureaucracy. This is very obvious in the UK, where Starmer Govt folk are complaining bitterly they cannot get the civil service to do anything, but you can see it elsewhere. Even in Australia, where we have a bit of a talent for making bureaucracy work.

A close friend (a university professor) is in despair as her (prestigious) university is in a downward spiral mainly due to its overweening, yet increasingly incompetent, central administration. Basic stuff like exams are not being done competently. But there is also noxious affirmative action, undermining what had been a consistently merit-based system, and “decolonising the curriculum” ideological zealotry.

Bureaucracy regularises administration, especially at scale, but also has a whole lot of potential pathologies. Xi is clearly wrestling with that. The evidence suggests, not all that successfully. His foreign policies, for instance, have been so good for US alliance-building, there are jokes about him being a US double agent, while recent Chinese economic performance has been not impressive compared to 1978-2012.

Recent anti-corruption removals have included folk Xi himself appointed. Corruption investigators have apparently taken to wearing bulletproof vests, as there have been recent incidents of officers shooting and killing investigators who came to arrest or question them.

There are lots of signs of stresses in the system, such as high youth unemployment and local protests. But the very prevalence of local protests is back to the PRC being very much not the USSR.

Max More's avatar

Could it be that the censors are so blind that they don't see 1984 or Animal Farm as saying anything about the Chinese system? Still, that doesn't explain the display of books by Hayek and Friedman.

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