Why is it that China is good at building rail lines, subways, and other infrastructure? Are these areas less regulated than in the US, despite the overall statism? (I know that's true in some areas in Sweden, for one.) As their working populations shrinks and ages rapidly, presumably building infrastructure will become harder.
China's centralized government can make quick decisions on large-scale projects without needing to navigate the extensive checks, balances, and public consultations common in democracies.
In contrast to the U.S., where infrastructure projects often face prolonged delays due to environmental reviews, lawsuits, and community objections, China's approval process is faster and more decisive.
Eminent Domain: The Chinese government has significant power to acquire land for public projects, often bypassing lengthy negotiations.
In the U.S., infrastructure funding often depends on fragmented budgets, public-private partnerships, or local initiatives, leading to inconsistent priorities and underfunding.
Lower Labor Costs: Despite rising wages, construction labor in China is still significantly cheaper than in the U.S.
Many infrastructure projects in China use standardized designs and construction methods, speeding up implementation and reducing costs.
Regulatory Environment: While China's regulatory system is stringent in some areas, infrastructure projects face fewer obstacles in terms of environmental reviews and public opposition. Regulations that might slow or halt projects in the U.S. are often streamlined or bypassed in China.
Contrast with the U.S.: Environmental reviews under laws like the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) can add years to U.S. projects. Public hearings, lawsuits, and advocacy groups often slow or stop projects
Massive Infrastructure Experience: China has developed unmatched expertise in large-scale infrastructure projects, including high-speed rail, bridges, and urban transit systems. This is partly due to the sheer scale and frequency of these projects.
Symbol of Progress: Infrastructure development is seen as a symbol of China’s modernization and global status. The government uses these projects to demonstrate its ability to deliver results for the public and to project power internationally.
Very clarifying. There is also the similarity of real estate assets collapsing in value a la early 1990s Japan. A highly managed financial sector is an obvious common element.
I have used the rai stones of Yap as an analogy for the trading of never finished, never occupied apartments. If everyone agrees something has value, and there is a shortage of alternative assets, then …. On the other hand, such agreement can be fragile to a change in the underlying parameters.
China has roughly the same population as the Americas. A country that has the equivalent of New York City and the boondocks of Colombia in the same country is indeed an interesting policy challenge.
The problem for China is they know their own history far too well. Whenever a regime in China has inflated it has ended up being replaced. The current regime is not prepared to take any risk of being replaced.
"Tyler Cowen asked me to explain why China doesn’t end its deflation, and I struggled to come up with an answer."
Xi Jinping: “What’s so bad about deflation? Don’t people like it when things are cheaper?”, quoted in the WSJ (12/29/24). The CCP knows what it is doing. It's an intentional choice. Li Keqiang was a PhD economist (whose wife translated the 'Yes, Minister' TV series into Chinese) . The likes of him have been disappearing from power during the years of Xi (see Kevin Rudd) whose education is all Marxism-Leninism. Financial repression to shift resources from consumers to support Party owned/controlled industries is basic Leninist economics. See the USSR from seizing all the Ukrainians' crops to fund building Stalin's factories, to having cosmonauts in space before the people had toilet paper. Look at China's level of consumption relative to other economies today. Not an accident.
China just announced it is slashing the salaries of its top economic regulators by 40% to 60% (at the Peoples Bank of China, National Financial Regulatory Administration, China Securities Regulatory Commission). "'Being 'red,' or politically loyal, is now considered more important for Chinese financial professionals than being competent', said Zhiwu Chen, professor of finance at The University of Hong Kong", WSJ.
I suggest that China's monetary policy is not its problem, but a consequence of its problem.
You should read the other comments first, as I've already addressed this. They don't want the deflation. If they did, they would not be doing all this wasteful fiscal stimulus in a vain attempt to boost demand. (Because of the debt situation, they would prefer not to be doing the stimulus.)
What is the exact meaning of deflation in the following sentence: "Or you could say that assuming a fixed value of the yuan, the deflation is caused by bad supply-side policies."?
On one hand, better supply-side policy causes "good deflation" assuming a fixed exchange rate. On the other hand, better supply-side policy causes higher NGDP assuming a fixed exchange rate.
China’s public debt has been increasing rapidly and is likely to continue to do so, including because of the need to recapitalise bank and take over debts of other entities that cannot be allowed to fail. Do the Chinese believe that all this debt will be repaid? If not, should not inflation be the outcome, regardless of what monetary policy does?
Perhaps I (or you) should ask John Cochrane the same question. According to my admittedly imperfect understanding of FTPL, monetary policy should make a difference only for the profile of inflation not the eventual outcome. Expansionary monetary policy should mean more inflation now and less later, though (again according to my imperfect understanding of FTPL according to Cochrane).
“The problem in Japan during the late 1990s was an unwillingness to engage in monetary stimulus for fear that it would lead to excessive yen depreciation.”
I had wondered at the reason.
Now if we could only discover the reason the Bernanke-Yelin Fed did not provide sufficient monetary stimulation to keep inflation consistently at (above during the initial recover period) 2%
***
“If I am correct, why don’t other pundits see this problem”
??? I thought the need for more monetary stimulus was pretty much the conventional wisdom.
***
“Thus, you could say that China’s deflation is caused by an overvalued yuan.”
Surely this would be reasoning from a price change (price level?). What’s wrong with saying it’s cause by failing to target a positive rate of inflation (or NGDP that implies a positive rate of inflation)? Not that outsiders would necessarily know which policy levers Xi needs to pull to accomplish this, but those are details he could leave to technicians.
***
“In contrast, China is increasingly inept at doing the easiest parts of development, ensuring that they have printed enough money.”
Taking “printed enough money” as a synecdoche, it flummoxed Bernanke!
***
“And that sort of claim appeared absurd for the US, at least until FDR devalued the dollar in April 1933.”
Well, at the time they only had the revaluation of the Pound as an example of the disadvantage of deflation policy. And Keynes was frightfully obscure.
***
“But when you look at all of the bad advice China is getting from respected foreign pundits,”
Well some of the advice is good – shift to investing in health and human capital instead of more manufacturing for export (and capital flight and currency depreciation would be good for exports) – it just does not increase aggregate demand.
No, the need for monetary stimulus is not the conventional wisdom, it's rarely even mentioned in articles on the Chinese economy. The usual focus is fiscal policy.
I mentioned exchange rates because the Chinese government appears to be fixated on that variable.
I've been wondering when you would have a formal post on this topic. I'll surmise that you waited until you were pretty sure about the conditions--something like "the car has been swerving over the road for a few years, but now it's definitely crashed into that tree..."
I wonder if Xi and many of his advisors have a fixation with the supposed value of their currency; a kind of pride of yuan syndrome that makes them think it has an intrinsic worth that prevents them wrong doing the right thing. "If we de-value, we are showing weakness" is not logical monetary policy, but it speaks to a nationalistic pride that seemed to have afflicted the Japanese for a few decades. The only thing that hurts more than admitting you're wrong is to continue to be wrong, but if you're not feeling the same amount of pain as your population it's easy to keep being wrong.
Is the issue simply that continuing growth without continuing money printing requires either wages to decrease, unemployment to increase, or growth to halt, and the latter is the most likely because people won't tolerate the other two?
> In the 1990s and 2000s, many western experts recommended the Japanese adopt quack remedies such as fiscal stimulus, which completely failed to provide growth in nominal GDP.
I'm curious if you have a sense as to how long ago you realized this advice is wrong consistently enough to be called a quack remedy.
> Yes, China has structural issues, made a bit worse by Xi Jinping’s partial retreat from previous market reforms. But the underlying structure of China’s economy is still strong enough to generate reasonable output growth, as along as monetary policymakers allow for sufficient nominal growth.
I think there's an interesting analogy to diseases like Parkinson's. You'd think that it would be an issue of damaged muscles or nerves, but this isn't so. The body is fine structurally; it doesn't have any "real" issues. Instead, the problem seems to be motivating the body to do what it can do, something more "nominal". People with Parkinson's can move well under extreme circumstances like a fire. Issues like chronic pain and depression are also often nominal rather than real in this sense—everything's fine, but nothing works.
Well, I've been criticizing the Japanese fiscal stimulus from the moment I started blogging in early 2009. So I wasn't surprised when Abe's policy was more effective.
Interesting medical analogy, but I don't know enough to comment. I've sometimes compared it to people assuming they had a virus, when the actual problem was a bacterial infection.
Krugman is correct to examine this from a saving/investment perspective, but I think he exaggerates the extent that the Chinese trade surplus is a problem for the rest of the world. As far as Pettis, what can I say? He has great expertise on the Chinese economy, but doesn't seem to have a sound grasp of international macroeconomics. Tariffs don't address problems like trade deficits and deindustrialization. Indeed trade deficits are not even a problem (although they may be a symptom of other problems, like anti-saving policies.)
“…the US government strongly pressured Japan to avoid yen depreciation, i.e., our government basically bullied them into deflation.”
It seems to me this simplest explanation is the correct one. Whether “bullied” is the correct term or not. And worse under Trump, but applicable even under Dem presidents.
China knows in the long run it would be hurt even more by tariffs and quotas imposed by the U.S. if its exports and so trade surplus increased more, which of course will happen if the yuan is devalued, and that is the primary reason they don’t go down that path.
Can you explain exactly why you don’t think that is the most likely reason?
Now if your issue is primarily about the advice to China from economists, that is indeed a separate question. But it seems to me quite easily explained by a combination of a) most economists are left of center, b) most are “globalists” who implicitly (if not explicitly) worry about my trade war possibility point above, and c) don’t subscribe to the SS view on nominal GDP targeting. Not suggesting they are correct about c), of course.
"which of course will happen if the yuan is devalued,"
See that's where I disagree. That would be true if the yuan depreciated due to more saving, but not if true because the yuan depreciated due to an expansionary monetary policy (that sucks in imports.)
I am saying that there is no reason to expect a larger trade surplus if China devalued through monetary stimulus, as imports would probably rise by more than exports.
Yes, I do not know that with certainty, as is usually the case in economics.
I think China'sPBoC should be more accommodative, and worse yet, has decided to stop buying China sovereign bonds.
Japan went heavy into QE after 2013, and have started cutting back on that now.
Michael Woodford says that QE plus fiscal stimulus is essential money-financed fiscal programs.
So far, despite the reduction in Japan's QE, inflation in Japan is stubbornly running about 1% above the BoJ target. Wait and see.
Japan has been running large national budget deficits for a long time, but seem to owe the money to themselves---that, is the Bank of Japan, which owns about half of Japan's national debt. US macroeconomists never really seem to address this topic.
As an aside, here is what AI says about Singapore's economy:
"Yes, Singapore is often considered a "dirigiste" economy, meaning that while it operates largely as a free market, the government actively intervenes and directs certain aspects of economic development through strategic policies and targeted investments, giving it a degree of state-led control; this is particularly evident in its focus on infrastructure development, industry selection, and talent attraction. "
Then add this:
"The (Singapore government) HDB public housing programmes are a source of national pride, and over 80% of Singapore's resident population calls HDB flats home."
Oh, and this:
"Singapore Medisave
A mandatory savings plan that funds a basic health insurance plan. Between 7% and 9.5% of a working person's wages are automatically deposited into their Medisave account. This plan covers most routine outpatient checkups, hospitalizations, and operations."
The history of Jurong Island, and the government-led creation of enormous petrochemical complexes there, and government ownership (through stock) of such facilities, is another topic.....and rather typical of the Sinagoire econmy..,curiously, even prices of streetside food vendors are regulated....
Singapore is unique...probably can't be copied. The big story: Like other exporting nations, it essentially suppresses/taxes consumption to subsidzie/finance export-led industries...(see Michael Pettis).
Usually commenters are banned for uncivil content, such as profane language or hate speech, not for having various viewpoints on debatable topics, politely expressed.
But it is your blog, and your standards for participation.
I find orthodox macroeconomic views on many topics debatable.
Why is it that China is good at building rail lines, subways, and other infrastructure? Are these areas less regulated than in the US, despite the overall statism? (I know that's true in some areas in Sweden, for one.) As their working populations shrinks and ages rapidly, presumably building infrastructure will become harder.
Here are excerpts from an answer by ChatGPT4o:
China's centralized government can make quick decisions on large-scale projects without needing to navigate the extensive checks, balances, and public consultations common in democracies.
In contrast to the U.S., where infrastructure projects often face prolonged delays due to environmental reviews, lawsuits, and community objections, China's approval process is faster and more decisive.
Eminent Domain: The Chinese government has significant power to acquire land for public projects, often bypassing lengthy negotiations.
In the U.S., infrastructure funding often depends on fragmented budgets, public-private partnerships, or local initiatives, leading to inconsistent priorities and underfunding.
Lower Labor Costs: Despite rising wages, construction labor in China is still significantly cheaper than in the U.S.
Many infrastructure projects in China use standardized designs and construction methods, speeding up implementation and reducing costs.
Regulatory Environment: While China's regulatory system is stringent in some areas, infrastructure projects face fewer obstacles in terms of environmental reviews and public opposition. Regulations that might slow or halt projects in the U.S. are often streamlined or bypassed in China.
Contrast with the U.S.: Environmental reviews under laws like the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) can add years to U.S. projects. Public hearings, lawsuits, and advocacy groups often slow or stop projects
Massive Infrastructure Experience: China has developed unmatched expertise in large-scale infrastructure projects, including high-speed rail, bridges, and urban transit systems. This is partly due to the sheer scale and frequency of these projects.
Symbol of Progress: Infrastructure development is seen as a symbol of China’s modernization and global status. The government uses these projects to demonstrate its ability to deliver results for the public and to project power internationally.
You have just summarized the Thomas Friedman view of why China is the superior economic model.
Especially as it relates to fighting climate change.
ChatGPT is excellent at summarizing left-of-center conventional wisdom.
I recreated old game "FED Chairman" if anyone remembers it.
https://aleksandar-b.github.io/blog/posts/fed-chairman-game
I don't know if this is allowed here, please feel free to delete if it is not.
I would *love* your feedback as I plan to add more features into it.
Nice! I doubt Scott would like the (exclusive?) emphasis on the interest rate though. "The interest rate is not monetary policy."
Yeah, I was thinking of adding other targets like 5year breakeven, monetary aggregates or employment level
I'm not really a game player, so I'll leave this to others.
Very clarifying. There is also the similarity of real estate assets collapsing in value a la early 1990s Japan. A highly managed financial sector is an obvious common element.
I have used the rai stones of Yap as an analogy for the trading of never finished, never occupied apartments. If everyone agrees something has value, and there is a shortage of alternative assets, then …. On the other hand, such agreement can be fragile to a change in the underlying parameters.
China has roughly the same population as the Americas. A country that has the equivalent of New York City and the boondocks of Colombia in the same country is indeed an interesting policy challenge.
"China has roughly the same population as the Americas"
More than two hundred million more.
The problem for China is they know their own history far too well. Whenever a regime in China has inflated it has ended up being replaced. The current regime is not prepared to take any risk of being replaced.
Actually, they are currently trying to boost the inflation rate, but they are using the wrong techniques.
"Tyler Cowen asked me to explain why China doesn’t end its deflation, and I struggled to come up with an answer."
Xi Jinping: “What’s so bad about deflation? Don’t people like it when things are cheaper?”, quoted in the WSJ (12/29/24). The CCP knows what it is doing. It's an intentional choice. Li Keqiang was a PhD economist (whose wife translated the 'Yes, Minister' TV series into Chinese) . The likes of him have been disappearing from power during the years of Xi (see Kevin Rudd) whose education is all Marxism-Leninism. Financial repression to shift resources from consumers to support Party owned/controlled industries is basic Leninist economics. See the USSR from seizing all the Ukrainians' crops to fund building Stalin's factories, to having cosmonauts in space before the people had toilet paper. Look at China's level of consumption relative to other economies today. Not an accident.
China just announced it is slashing the salaries of its top economic regulators by 40% to 60% (at the Peoples Bank of China, National Financial Regulatory Administration, China Securities Regulatory Commission). "'Being 'red,' or politically loyal, is now considered more important for Chinese financial professionals than being competent', said Zhiwu Chen, professor of finance at The University of Hong Kong", WSJ.
I suggest that China's monetary policy is not its problem, but a consequence of its problem.
You should read the other comments first, as I've already addressed this. They don't want the deflation. If they did, they would not be doing all this wasteful fiscal stimulus in a vain attempt to boost demand. (Because of the debt situation, they would prefer not to be doing the stimulus.)
That triptych is incredible
NYT on China record trade surplus 2024
https://archive.ph/w661z#selection-1063.0-1071.31
Making my point elsewhere that it’s about the repercussions of an even greater Chinese surplus in goods-and-services trade.
What is the exact meaning of deflation in the following sentence: "Or you could say that assuming a fixed value of the yuan, the deflation is caused by bad supply-side policies."?
On one hand, better supply-side policy causes "good deflation" assuming a fixed exchange rate. On the other hand, better supply-side policy causes higher NGDP assuming a fixed exchange rate.
I meant the latter. Good supply-side policies raise the equilibrium real exchange rate. That means higher prices for any given nominal exchange rate.
China’s public debt has been increasing rapidly and is likely to continue to do so, including because of the need to recapitalise bank and take over debts of other entities that cannot be allowed to fail. Do the Chinese believe that all this debt will be repaid? If not, should not inflation be the outcome, regardless of what monetary policy does?
Hard to say. Japan also has a huge national debt, but it hasn't resulted in much inflation (so far).
Perhaps I (or you) should ask John Cochrane the same question. According to my admittedly imperfect understanding of FTPL, monetary policy should make a difference only for the profile of inflation not the eventual outcome. Expansionary monetary policy should mean more inflation now and less later, though (again according to my imperfect understanding of FTPL according to Cochrane).
That may be an implication of the FTPL, but of course I don't believe that model applies to the US.
“The problem in Japan during the late 1990s was an unwillingness to engage in monetary stimulus for fear that it would lead to excessive yen depreciation.”
I had wondered at the reason.
Now if we could only discover the reason the Bernanke-Yelin Fed did not provide sufficient monetary stimulation to keep inflation consistently at (above during the initial recover period) 2%
***
“If I am correct, why don’t other pundits see this problem”
??? I thought the need for more monetary stimulus was pretty much the conventional wisdom.
***
“Thus, you could say that China’s deflation is caused by an overvalued yuan.”
Surely this would be reasoning from a price change (price level?). What’s wrong with saying it’s cause by failing to target a positive rate of inflation (or NGDP that implies a positive rate of inflation)? Not that outsiders would necessarily know which policy levers Xi needs to pull to accomplish this, but those are details he could leave to technicians.
***
“In contrast, China is increasingly inept at doing the easiest parts of development, ensuring that they have printed enough money.”
Taking “printed enough money” as a synecdoche, it flummoxed Bernanke!
***
“And that sort of claim appeared absurd for the US, at least until FDR devalued the dollar in April 1933.”
Well, at the time they only had the revaluation of the Pound as an example of the disadvantage of deflation policy. And Keynes was frightfully obscure.
***
“But when you look at all of the bad advice China is getting from respected foreign pundits,”
Well some of the advice is good – shift to investing in health and human capital instead of more manufacturing for export (and capital flight and currency depreciation would be good for exports) – it just does not increase aggregate demand.
Of course, if they had just listened to ME…. 😊 https://thomaslhutcheson.substack.com/p/china-needs-more-consumption
No, the need for monetary stimulus is not the conventional wisdom, it's rarely even mentioned in articles on the Chinese economy. The usual focus is fiscal policy.
I mentioned exchange rates because the Chinese government appears to be fixated on that variable.
I've been wondering when you would have a formal post on this topic. I'll surmise that you waited until you were pretty sure about the conditions--something like "the car has been swerving over the road for a few years, but now it's definitely crashed into that tree..."
I wonder if Xi and many of his advisors have a fixation with the supposed value of their currency; a kind of pride of yuan syndrome that makes them think it has an intrinsic worth that prevents them wrong doing the right thing. "If we de-value, we are showing weakness" is not logical monetary policy, but it speaks to a nationalistic pride that seemed to have afflicted the Japanese for a few decades. The only thing that hurts more than admitting you're wrong is to continue to be wrong, but if you're not feeling the same amount of pain as your population it's easy to keep being wrong.
I have done a few previous posts on this issue.
Is the issue simply that continuing growth without continuing money printing requires either wages to decrease, unemployment to increase, or growth to halt, and the latter is the most likely because people won't tolerate the other two?
> In the 1990s and 2000s, many western experts recommended the Japanese adopt quack remedies such as fiscal stimulus, which completely failed to provide growth in nominal GDP.
I'm curious if you have a sense as to how long ago you realized this advice is wrong consistently enough to be called a quack remedy.
> Yes, China has structural issues, made a bit worse by Xi Jinping’s partial retreat from previous market reforms. But the underlying structure of China’s economy is still strong enough to generate reasonable output growth, as along as monetary policymakers allow for sufficient nominal growth.
I think there's an interesting analogy to diseases like Parkinson's. You'd think that it would be an issue of damaged muscles or nerves, but this isn't so. The body is fine structurally; it doesn't have any "real" issues. Instead, the problem seems to be motivating the body to do what it can do, something more "nominal". People with Parkinson's can move well under extreme circumstances like a fire. Issues like chronic pain and depression are also often nominal rather than real in this sense—everything's fine, but nothing works.
Well, I've been criticizing the Japanese fiscal stimulus from the moment I started blogging in early 2009. So I wasn't surprised when Abe's policy was more effective.
Interesting medical analogy, but I don't know enough to comment. I've sometimes compared it to people assuming they had a virus, when the actual problem was a bacterial infection.
Krugman and Noah Smith both have new posts on China today:
https://paulkrugman.substack.com/p/chinas-very-bad-no-good-trillion
https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/the-pettis-paradigm-and-the-second
Neither is exactly shouting "China should devalue" from the rooftops.
Krugman is correct to examine this from a saving/investment perspective, but I think he exaggerates the extent that the Chinese trade surplus is a problem for the rest of the world. As far as Pettis, what can I say? He has great expertise on the Chinese economy, but doesn't seem to have a sound grasp of international macroeconomics. Tariffs don't address problems like trade deficits and deindustrialization. Indeed trade deficits are not even a problem (although they may be a symptom of other problems, like anti-saving policies.)
“…the US government strongly pressured Japan to avoid yen depreciation, i.e., our government basically bullied them into deflation.”
It seems to me this simplest explanation is the correct one. Whether “bullied” is the correct term or not. And worse under Trump, but applicable even under Dem presidents.
China knows in the long run it would be hurt even more by tariffs and quotas imposed by the U.S. if its exports and so trade surplus increased more, which of course will happen if the yuan is devalued, and that is the primary reason they don’t go down that path.
Can you explain exactly why you don’t think that is the most likely reason?
Now if your issue is primarily about the advice to China from economists, that is indeed a separate question. But it seems to me quite easily explained by a combination of a) most economists are left of center, b) most are “globalists” who implicitly (if not explicitly) worry about my trade war possibility point above, and c) don’t subscribe to the SS view on nominal GDP targeting. Not suggesting they are correct about c), of course.
"which of course will happen if the yuan is devalued,"
See that's where I disagree. That would be true if the yuan depreciated due to more saving, but not if true because the yuan depreciated due to an expansionary monetary policy (that sucks in imports.)
You are saying that exports will not increase given a depreciated yuan?
That is beyond counterintuitive.
Or are you saying that the trade surplus MIGHT not increase? That of course is plausible.
It might even be probable, ceteris paribus, for reasons you understand better than most of us. Seems to me that would depend on multiple factors.
But it’s hardly knowable with anything approaching certainty that the trade surplus would not increase, right?
I am saying that there is no reason to expect a larger trade surplus if China devalued through monetary stimulus, as imports would probably rise by more than exports.
Yes, I do not know that with certainty, as is usually the case in economics.
Add on:
Yields on 10-year China sovereign bonds recently struck all-time records lows, around 1.65%.
I think China'sPBoC should be more accommodative, and worse yet, has decided to stop buying China sovereign bonds.
Japan went heavy into QE after 2013, and have started cutting back on that now.
Michael Woodford says that QE plus fiscal stimulus is essential money-financed fiscal programs.
So far, despite the reduction in Japan's QE, inflation in Japan is stubbornly running about 1% above the BoJ target. Wait and see.
Japan has been running large national budget deficits for a long time, but seem to owe the money to themselves---that, is the Bank of Japan, which owns about half of Japan's national debt. US macroeconomists never really seem to address this topic.
As an aside, here is what AI says about Singapore's economy:
"Yes, Singapore is often considered a "dirigiste" economy, meaning that while it operates largely as a free market, the government actively intervenes and directs certain aspects of economic development through strategic policies and targeted investments, giving it a degree of state-led control; this is particularly evident in its focus on infrastructure development, industry selection, and talent attraction. "
Then add this:
"The (Singapore government) HDB public housing programmes are a source of national pride, and over 80% of Singapore's resident population calls HDB flats home."
Oh, and this:
"Singapore Medisave
A mandatory savings plan that funds a basic health insurance plan. Between 7% and 9.5% of a working person's wages are automatically deposited into their Medisave account. This plan covers most routine outpatient checkups, hospitalizations, and operations."
The history of Jurong Island, and the government-led creation of enormous petrochemical complexes there, and government ownership (through stock) of such facilities, is another topic.....and rather typical of the Sinagoire econmy..,curiously, even prices of streetside food vendors are regulated....
Singapore is unique...probably can't be copied. The big story: Like other exporting nations, it essentially suppresses/taxes consumption to subsidzie/finance export-led industries...(see Michael Pettis).
Please stop your moronic comments, before I have to ban you.
Usually commenters are banned for uncivil content, such as profane language or hate speech, not for having various viewpoints on debatable topics, politely expressed.
But it is your blog, and your standards for participation.
I find orthodox macroeconomic views on many topics debatable.