Who says no?

Thoughts on Taiwan and Mainland China

In late 2023, I visited Taiwan for a few days. After returning to the US, I wrote a post entitled “China’s Best Province”, which made several points:

1. I greatly prefer Taiwan to any mainland province, in all sorts of ways. It has China’s best political system, by far. It’s China’s most market-oriented province, and its richest (with the possible exception of Hong Kong and Macao.) I much prefer Taiwan’s culture to that of any other Chinese province (including Hong Kong.)

2. Taiwan is a part of China. It is self-governing and is de facto independent. But it is de jure a part of China and has been for many centuries.

Almost everyone hates my views on China. On the mainland, Chinese nationalists consider me to be both sympathetic to Taiwan and opposed to the CCP. And that’s true.

In America, my view that Taiwan is a part of China and my opposition to America’s cold war against China makes me viewed as a CCP apologist. And that’s not true. In recent years, I’ve come to believe that right wing authoritarian nationalism is the greatest problem facing the world, and China under Xi Jinping is certainly a right-wing authoritarian regime.

On the other hand, since 1980 the CCP has instituted policy reforms that led to the largest improvement in human well-being in world history—by far. China is the ultimate glass half full/half empty story, in the world’s largest glass.

I said “almost everyone” hates my views on China. There are a few exceptions. Here’s Daniel Frank, from a post that is largely a love letter to Taiwan:

Taiwan is the nicest and most pleasant place I’ve ever been. Said simply, it felt like a much richer and more advanced society than my own. Coming home made me feel sad about the state of my home.

You might be surprised that he also holds the following views (excerpted from a long post that is otherwise almost entirely non-political):

The intention of this post isn’t primarily political, and I do not want to prognosticate too deeply about the potential for conflict between Taiwan and China. Rather, I will share a few superficial observations related to identity and governance. The most significant cultural site in Taiwan is arguably the National Palace Museum. But, you see, the National Palace Museum in Taipei is fundamentally not a museum about Taiwan qua Taiwan; it is a museum showcasing the history and treasures of the Chinese nation — sadly, it is actually the most significant Chinese heritage museum anywhere, as most Chinese artifacts were destroyed during the cultural revolution. When you see Taiwan through the lens presented by its most famous museum (and reflecting the historical stance of the ROC), you don’t see a distinct, independent nation asserting its unique identity, but rather a polity positioning itself as the legitimate steward of historical China. Granted, this reflects the official KMT position historically and shouldn’t be a surprise, but I want to stress that for almost all of the Republic of China’s history on Taiwan, the stated goal has been eventual reunification with China, alongside an acknowledgement that they are part of the same nation. I am generally wary of independence movements and will acknowledge that the legal claims underpinning Taiwanese independence appear quite weak, and more critically, the ROC government itself has historically not pursued formal independence as its primary strategy. I think there is an alternative history where Taiwan acted with conviction and made independence a reality, but that is not the world we live in and I think the conviction is not there to truly make something so difficult and audacious to happen. So, despite being now a devoted fanboy of Taiwan, my political leanings don’t align with the zealous Taiwan supporters in the West (who I don’t think are speaking from Taiwan’s perspective at all, but rather reflecting an in-group/out-group anti-CCP stance). In short, based on these observations, I find it difficult to envision an independent Taiwan enduring, nor do I think the current status quo can persist indefinitely. I also don’t view this potential outcome as inherently spiritually wrong, given the historical context. I hope for the best, but fear something sub-optimal and unpleasant. I think a hot war between China and Taiwan is extremely unlikely.

That’s quite similar to my view, but I rarely meet people who share this perspective. (I say “similar”, not identical, as (unfortunately) I view a hot war as somewhat unlikely, but not “extremely unlikely”.)

[BTW, Daniel Frank’s blog entitled ”not not Talmud” is full of wisdom.]

Here is Tanner Greer describing an isolationist faction in the Trump coalition:

For the last few years, the Taiwanese have emphasized, “We are a democracy. We’re a liberal democracy in Asia.” They’ve often said things like, “We’re the only liberal democracy in Asia that has legalized gay marriage.” This is not only unconvincing to these [Trump] people, it’s an anti-signal — an argument against Taiwan’s defense.

Many of these individuals would not be willing to defend Taiwan for the sake of values they don’t necessarily hold . . . they don’t believe the United States has a vested interest in fighting a war with China, especially over Taiwan. . . .

I recommend people read an essay written by Michael Anton in 2021 for The Federalist, entitled, “Why It’s Clearly Not In America’s Interest To Go To War Over Taiwan.” Michael Anton is now heading policy at the State Department. In the essay, he lists reasons why we shouldn’t defend Taiwan, most related to America’s lack of strength.

When explaining why he believes America isn’t strong, he mentions the typical concerns about shipbuilding numbers but then adds points about pride flags and transgender troops.

Today, Mainland China has become very similar to what Taiwan was in 1975, a right-wing authoritarian middle income country with a mixed economy. Thus, it has achieved almost everything ROC leadership might have wished for 50 years ago. If today’s China had existed in 1975, Mainland China and Taiwan might have peacefully reunified.

But today’s Taiwan is much different from the Taiwan of 1975; it is a relatively liberal and affluent democratic country with a free market economy. China has caught up to the Taiwan of 1975, only to find that today’s Taiwan has raced further ahead. Will the China of 2075 once again resemble the Taiwan of 50 years earlier? I would not be at all surprised if this were to happen, nor would I be surprised if it did not.

The past decade has seen one of the fastest periods of cultural change in human history—and nowhere is that more evident than in Mainland China. At first, I was reluctant to trust what I saw on visits in 2023 and 2024. But I’ve recently spoken with several people who have noticed the same thing—the “Japanification of China”. In the past decade, China has become dramatically cleaner, safer, richer, more stylish, more polite, more orderly and more law abiding. People routinely leave purses or cell phones on the table when they run to the restroom, or out to their car—unthinkable when I first visited China. (To be clear, it still falls well short of Japan in most of those areas.)

Visitors to Taiwan often remark that its culture seems to mix Chinese and Japanese features—perhaps because Japan colonized Taiwan for 50 years. This means that recent changes on the mainland are not just making China more like Japan, they are making it more like Taiwan, at least in a cultural sense.

Part 2: Who says no?

Sports fans are familiar with the phrase, “Who says no?” which is applied to hypothetical trades where two teams swap athletes. So here’s a proposal:

Taiwan and the PRC agree to unify in 50 years, with the proviso that each region is allowed to maintain a separate military until 2075.

The proposal is obviously similar to the Hong Kong agreement of 1997, but the provision allowing Taiwan to keep its independent military for 50 years greatly reduces the risk of a premature Chinese intervention.

So what’s in it for Mainland China?

Xi Jinping has surely noticed that Russia’s Ukraine invasion turned out to be more difficult than expected. If he is rational, he probably views a war with Taiwan as having little upside and a substantial risk of catastrophic failure. So why is China preparing for war? I’m not sure, but I suspect they are doing so to pressure Taiwan. The threat of war must be credible to prevent Taiwan from a formal declaration of independence, which would be intolerable to China’s noisy nationalist community.

A 50-year reunification agreement would seem close enough to the Hong Kong deal that Xi could trumpet it as a huge victory for the Chinese nation. He could claim to be the leader that secured what Mao and Deng were unable to achieve, a firm commitment for eventual unification. And he could do so without firing a shot. Indeed, this might also allow Xi to improve relations with other nations (including Trump’s America), and perhaps reduce costly economic sanctions.

So what’s in it for Taiwan?

Taiwan would avoid the risk of a devastating war. Indeed, it’s not even clear that the Taiwanese people would be willing to fight if such a war were to occur, as many people on the island (and even more on outlying parts of the Republic of China such as Kinmen island) would prefer reunification over war. There’s a reason why Taiwanese defense spending is so low—they do not wish to fight.

Of course, there is a risk that the mainland cheats on the deal, and begins prematurely restricting Taiwanese freedoms, just as they restricted free speech in Hong Kong before the 50 years had expired. But that risk exists today, and thus this sort of agreement does nothing to increase the risk of Chinese aggression, as Taiwan would maintain its military. As time went by, the Chinese would have less and less incentive to “jump the gun” and attack Taiwan before 2075, especially given that Beijing could increasingly see the “end of the tunnel”. So I believe that this agreement would give Taiwan a 50-year breathing spell. And a lot can happen in 50 years.

Obviously, there are downsides in this agreement for each side of the dispute—otherwise it would have already happened. China would worry that Taiwan reneges on the deal in 2075, and Taiwan would worry that China continues to have an authoritarian political regime in 2075. For this to work, the Taiwanese need to believe that further Chinese liberalization is likely, and the Chinese need to believe that the Taiwanese will not be willing to renege and risk war in 2075. Ironically, both sides share the same basic incentive—further Chinese liberalization makes it both more likely that the Taiwanese will find reunification acceptable, and more likely that they will not renege on the agreement.

I like the idea of an agreement that gives a nation of 1.4 billion people more incentive to “do the right thing” when it comes to economic, political and social reforms.

So, who says no?

Part 3: Is Taiwan willing to fight?

Here I’d like to include some evidence for my claim that Taiwanese society is deeply divided on the issue of China, despite the fact that very few of its residents favor immediate reunification. Consider some recent cuts to Taiwanese military spending and foreign affairs:

Forty-four percent of the Ministry of Defense’s budget has been either reduced or frozen, including funding for operations, procurement, maintenance, the development of domestic submarines and drones, and overseas travel. This severely hampers Taiwan’s defense capabilities, as the budget cuts block the development of submarines and drones – critical components for asymmetric warfare against Beijing. The freeze on operating funds and cuts to media budgets undermine the military’s ability to respond to Beijing’s military aircraft incursions, vessel intrusions, cyberattacks, and cognitive warfare, as well as affecting basic recruitment efforts. The reduction in travel expenses weakens overseas training and equipment deliveries, especially since Taiwan heavily relies on the United States for military procurement and training. Most importantly, the budget cuts raise international doubts about Taiwan’s determination to defend itself.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also heavily affected, with 50 percent of its operating budget frozen and all media budgets eliminated. This severely restricts Taiwan’s interactions with democratic allies and even the basic operations of its consulates and embassies abroad. . . .

In the meantime, Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office expressed “support for the KMT and TPP’s decision to reduce the media budget, criticizing the DPP administration for using public funds to brainwash the people.”

What does Taiwan actually want?

Here is The Economist:

The DPP has thrown its support behind a mass campaign to recall KMT legislators, accusing them of scheming with China to weaken Taiwan. They point at Fu Kun-chi, the KMT’s legislative leader, who last year led a delegation to Beijing to meet Wang Huning, the number four in the Communist Party who is in charge of policy on Taiwan. Mr Wang welcomed Mr Fu with talk of being one family and working together to prevent Taiwan’s independence.

Upon their return, KMT legislators adopted a law expanding the parliament’s powers at the expense of the president. When parts of it were ruled unconstitutional, they passed another law that paralysed the constitutional court. In January they made sweeping cuts to the budget, including defence, the coastguard and cyber-security.

Indeed, there are regional splits even within Taiwan:

Taiwan’s prime minister called the cuts “suicidal”. Mr Lai warned that they would undermine Taiwan’s security and give allies the impression Taiwan was not serious about defending itself. KMT legislators deny that they are plotting with China and insist they are simply acting in the best interests of their constituents. But China clearly seeks to help politicians who pay it homage, such as Mr Fu. He represents the sparsely populated county of Hualien, whose main industries are farming and tourism, which both rely on China.

Whereas activists in Taipei accuse Mr Fu of being a sell-out, in Hualien his ties with China have made him more popular. In 2022 China banned imports from Taiwan of pomelo, a citrus fruit. After Mr Fu’s trip to Beijing it lifted the ban on pomelos from Hualien, but not on those from pro-DPP areas.

Don’t equate Taiwan with Ukraine

Here’s another Economist article, suggesting why it might be better for Taiwan to make a deal today:

China’s grey-zone tactics are designed to exploit the third factor, which is the chronic dysfunction of Taiwan’s politics. While few Taiwanese want to be part of a communist-run China, their politics suffers from a toxic blend of polarisation and complacency. Since elections last year, Lai Ching-te, the president, has shared power with a parliament run by the mainland-appeasing KMT and a new third party backed by young Taiwanese disillusioned with the DPP. The resulting gridlock prevents Taiwan from taking decisive measures to raise its defence spending, cut its reliance on imported energy, or prepare for a crisis. Mr Lai’s efforts to crack down on Chinese infiltration have backfired, amplifying polarisation.

These factors could power a harmful feedback loop inside Taiwan, even if Mr Trump climbs down over trade. If America weakens its commitment to defending Taiwan, then Taiwan may lose the resolve to resist. And if Taiwan is not prepared to defend itself, America will be less likely to come to its aid. The risk is that this creates a trajectory in which Taiwan gradually comes under China’s sway without a shot being fired. True, Mr Trump could choose to escalate at any point. But rather than risk a nuclear war with China, he may let the island slip away or make a deal that, in effect, gives it up.

FWIW, I suspect that today it would be Taiwan that says no. If the question were posed a few days before an imminent Chinese invasion, then Taiwan would likely say yes and China would say no. Is there an in between period where both say yes? That’s one of those game theory problems.

The US attacked Iran? I subcontract all Middle East analysis to Matt Yglesias.

PS. Taiwan and China agree on more than you might think. Both view Kinmen and Matsu as being part of Fujian province, although they differ on how Fujian province should be spelled (The Taiwanese prefer “Fuchien”.) Both agree that the disputed islands in the South China Sea belong to China, and indeed Taiwan’s military occupies the largest and most important of such islands.

Kinmen (formerly Quemoy) is more pro-Chinese than Taiwan:

Today, Kinmen's 197,000 residents have family and history on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and shuttle regularly by ferry back and forth to the Chinese city of Xiamen. They are wary of talking to journalists for fear that doing so will hurt their businesses, which rely on Chinese customers, or loved ones who are Chinese citizens.

Some have expressed mistrust of the Democratic Progressive Party government in Taipei, especially during the recent dispute over the fatal Chinese fishing boat incident.

At times, the island's loyalties can seem fluid. In 2022, it emerged that one of the island's generals was a Chinese spy who had pledged to surrender the island in the event of a Chinese invasion.

PPS. Taiwanese schoolchildren visit the Palace Museum to see the greatest treasures of “their history” (meaning Chinese history), such as this beautiful carving of a head of cabbage carved out of jade. Notice the cricket in the upper right:

PPPS. After writing this post, I came across an interesting interview:

Steve Hsu:

51:43

Oh of course. I mean, you know, it's so funny, because on X I will always get - if I point something out, like, hey, you know what? BYD is shipping a hybrid vehicle that has like, 2000 kilometer range, and it's to people like, what are you a CCP shill? Like, are they paying you to, like? And so, like, the current climate is that if you actually just make some factual statement about what's happening in China, you're going to be under attack.

Razib Khan:

52:15

Yes, that's bad. That's a bad comment.

Steve Hsu:

52:18

So, for the record, I'm a patriotic American. I actually hope for the best for my you know, the people that I grew up with in Iowa, I had an incredible childhood in Iowa with wonderful people all white, pretty much.

I’ve faced similar reactions when I do things like rave about China’s high speed rail system.

PPPPS. I recently discussed AI risk with Liron Shapira: