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Scott Sumner's avatar

Everyone, I added a few updates at the end of the post. I highly recommend the Stephen Kirchner post that I linked to.

Jim Glass's avatar

Hi. Congrats on the new forum. I don't know if you follow your sibling substack "The East is Read", but it has some informative recent articles that seem on point to this subject:

(1) Xu Gao's case for stimulus -- Chief Economist of Bank of China International tears apart the opposition (parts 1 & 2)

(2) Ting Lu advises against common "cash handouts" proposal for China's economic slump.

FYI. ... "May a million readers bloom" for you here.

Scott Sumner's avatar

Thanks for the tip.

Henry Bee's avatar

Why would China import US monetary policy when they have capital flow is restricted? The trilemma says a country can have 2 of 3 (free capital flow, free monetary policy, fixed FX). Since China restricts capital flow, shouldn't they be able to have both fixed FX and a free monetary policy?

Scott Sumner's avatar

They still need to worry about the trade channel, which puts deflationary pressure on China.

Capital restrictions give them some leeway, but not too much.

Anonymous Skimmer's avatar

"Monetary policy is far too blunt an instrument to address sectoral imbalances."

Every 3 months my credit card company offers 5% cash back on purchases in certain sectors, which end at the end of the 3 month period. Presumably this functions as an aggregate consumption booster for these sectors. If China only wants to boost domestic demand in the face of deflation, expiring 'free money' coupons or credits for citizens seems like a possible idea that would have no impact on interest or exchange rates.

Edit: I see this is addressed below with the Ting Lu reference, but these seem to be free money vouchers for anything, not specific sectors.

Scott Sumner's avatar

I'm not at all sure that this policy would have no effect on the exchange rate or interest rates. Wouldn't a decline in savings rates tend to boost interest rates?

Anonymous Skimmer's avatar

You know better than I do.

Trying to think through how this works, how is the velocity of money, and ownership of money, related to interest rates? I would presume that the supply/demand curve component of interest rates only has so much room to move. And in a partial cartel-like situation such as exists with bank interest rates that the government has room to maneuver here (e.g. reserve requirements). Though yes, you're right, in that anything that requires a countervailing force is having an impact.

Regardless, I agree with the Ting Lu post that the more secure people feel the more willing they are to spend. And that if the government is going to subsidize anything, it should be this feeling of security. The only people who spend even more are those who feel they have nothing left to lose, and that is not sustainable.

Benjamin Cole's avatar

Central bankers cannot be left in charge of monetary policy. Inevitably they fixate on exchange rates or inflation too much.

The Bank of Thailand is also too tight. The Bank of Japan is barely accommodative enough, and yet it seems to want to become too tight. The Fed is likely too tight presently.

The macroeconomics profession is a muddle on what is QE, when concurrent to fiscal deficits. Michael Woodford says QE+deficits is money-financed fiscal programs.

John Cochrane just wrote a bunch of posts that Japan had the perfect monetary policy for decades.

If you are not confused, then maybe you do not understand the situation.

Sith Lord's avatar

Xi Jinping is a textbook Communist stuck in 1960s era nostalgia for Mao and the Cultural Revolution. He’s obsessed with the Chinese equivalent of DEI policies, such as rural poverty alleviation and unprofitable BRI projects, rather than providing avenues for the smart and talented to grow the economy. Loose or tight monetary policy won’t make much difference.

Scott Sumner's avatar

I agree that a change in monetary policy won't solve China's biggest problems. But the comparison to DEI is a stretch.

Anonymous Skimmer's avatar

"DEI policies, such as rural poverty alleviation"

"rather than providing avenues for the smart and talented to grow the economy"

The original DEI policy of the mid 20th century in the US was precisely to find the smart and talented rural people and get them to universities. Along with the GI bill.

Sith Lord's avatar

You are right. He does have a number of other unpopular DEI-style policies, but this is not one of them.

Tim Condon's avatar

Pettis says China is over-investing, you say the current account surplus is due to over-saving…

Scott Sumner's avatar

I believe he is saying they are over-investing, and also over-saving by an even wider margin. But I'm not certain.

Tim Condon's avatar

To be simultaneously saving and investing too much is incoherent and points to issues with “too much.” Too much for Pettis may be just right for Chinese people.

Scott Sumner's avatar

I don't know if Pettis is correct, but there's nothing incoherent about the claim. Let's say China now saves 45% of GDP and invests 40% of GDP. Suppose Pettis wants both figures to fall to 30% of GDP. What's "incoherent" about that recommendation?

You second sentence is true, but keep in mind that these decisions are not just made by the "Chinese people", the government also plays a big role.

Dave Stuhlsatz's avatar

Good analysis--large parts over my head--but the consistently bad monetary policy of China seems perfectly consistent with Xi's indifference to reality and his tendency to create a cult of advisors who cannot tell him that a different approach should be considered (The recent issue of The Economist had several articles on this). Could part of the problem be that he has thoroughly bought into the conventional fallacy that any type of loose money is a sign of undisciplined profligacy that begets moral hazard and leads to Zimbabwe/Weimar levels of decadence?

I appreciated Kirchner's comments on the irony of how Xi's professions of China's independence are at odds with their strong links to U.S. Fed policy. If they wanted to truly decouple they wouldn't be like Japan, they'd be like North Korea.

Scott Sumner's avatar

I think it's mostly worry about the exchange rate. But for fiscal policy I'd agree with your suggestion about Xi's worry over profligacy.

Viennacapitalist's avatar

Scott,

If, as you write (agree), china‘s natural rate has decreased, then this means that the ccp‘s growth target is unrealistic/too high. Should not, in this case, a lower NGDP target be assumed? Dont forget that the revised 4 percent target is still high by historical standards... if true, this could mean that the observed deflation is of the good sort..what do you think

Scott Sumner's avatar

The problem isn't so much the 4% rate, it's the sharp deceleration. In the long run, 4% is fine.

Thomas L. Hutcheson's avatar

"People view monetary policy as being in some sense about interest rates and the credit markets, whereas in fact it is all about the supply and demand for base money and the growth rate of nominal GDP."

It is neither. Those are possible policy instruments. The "policy" is about affecting some outcome like inflation or NGDP. The Chinese central bank is in the best position ot know whihc instruments to use to achieve what it wishes to achieve.

Ken Stanley's avatar

It would seem that a country with year over year CA surplus and a controlled exchange rate could easily create inflation.

Another thought. Has China’s export driven/consumption suppression model become too entrenched and gone to far? So far that domestic AD is now suppressed into a deflationary spiral?

Scott Sumner's avatar

Those are separate issues. The deflation problem is unrelated to the export driven model. Indeed a weaker yuan (nominal) would help to boost the price level.

Ken Stanley's avatar

Is this an example of the “monetary trilemma”? Has China’s commitment to a controlled exchange rate reduced its ability to focus monetary policy on domestic economic needs?

Egor Duda's avatar

Is it correct to presume, that current combo of 4% NGDP growth + 5% real growth + 1% deflation is detrimental only to the extent that contracts were signed in anticipation of higher NGDP growth rate?

In that case I guess it's mainly debt contracts, because it's doubtful that there's a money illusion-type discontinuity at 4% wage growth for Chinese employees.

What kind of adverse effects, aside from bank failures, can current NGDP growth rate have for China?

Scott Sumner's avatar

Yes, it's due to contracts, but I'd include labor contracts as a problem. Wage stickiness increases unemployment and reduces output.

Egor Duda's avatar

Yes, but wage stickiness cause unemployment when nominal wages start falling, not when they grow slower then before, as far as I understand?

What if NGDP slowdown is deliberate, if not explicit PBoC policy? They know that they real growth is slowing, so previous double-digit rates of NGDP growth are not sustainable.

I understand, that if this deliberate slowdown is unannounced, it loses 90% of its effectiveness. But, still, they must make monetary policy tighter one way or another, and may be their inability to do forward guidance on future path of NGDP growth is their political constraint, so they're doing it "secretly"

BTW this reminds me of situation in Russia in 2010-2016, when Russian NGDP growth slowed down from around 20% to 4-5%. There were several high-profile bank failures, but unemployment situation was ok

Scott Sumner's avatar

In 1982, a slowdown in nominal wage growth in the US was associated with high unemployment, so it doesn't have to be an outright decline if high wage growth had been previously expected.

Lorenzo Warby's avatar

Ooh, goodie, a new Scott Sumner book to read. (Well, new to me.)

Matthias Görgens's avatar

It would be interesting, if the PRC picked up ngpdp level targeting at 4% a year, and would then end up with slight deflation and yet a robust economy.

Btw, I don't think China is over-investing, at least not in general. They still have a long way to go before they are even as rich eg Taiwan (and Taiwan isn't as rich as eg Singapore). And part of that gap is surely explained by a relative lack of capital.

However China might not need more steel making capacity, or whatever else industrial policy is pushing these days.

Scott Sumner's avatar

I'm no expert on the subject, but I think it's mostly malinvestment in the wrong areas. But it wouldn't surprise me if they were also over-investing to some extent.

Yes, they still do need lots more capital in some areas. But for a country with a per capita GDP of only about $13,000 (say $25,000PPP) China already has some very impressive infrastructure. It seems to me that its high speed rail, highways, subways, airports, etc, are at least 70% to 80% complete.